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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLL\M G.\RTH SEEGMILLER 
and ~L\RjORIE SEEGMILLER, dba 
~L\DE~lOISELLE BEAUTY SALON, 
or i\1.\l)E~lOISELLE SALON OF 
BE1\UTY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Case No. 9933 
vs. 
:\L HUNT, dba MADEMOISELLE 
COIFFURES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Defendant has advanced several propositions in his 
brief that were not dealt with by plaintiffs. He has also 
misconstrued the evidence in several respects. 
Inasmuch as the opposing parties to this litigation 
have cited the same basic decisions in support of their 
respective positions, a close consideration of the facts and 
of the legal principles_ applicable thereto becomes of para-
mount importance. 
The lower court found, as facts, that the parties are 
operating in different trade areas and that there is no 
competition between them. It found, however, that, ex-
cept for this, defendant's use of plaintiffs' mark would be 
confusing. 
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I 
LOWER COUR1,'S FINDING OF FACT AS TO 
TRADE AREAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The statement of facts in defendant's brief does not 
give a true picture. It is apparent from a careful re-
view of the evidence adduced by plaintiffs that the trial 
judge ~erred in his finding as to trade areas .. 
In challenging plaintiffs' assertions of extensive ad-
vertising coverage, defendant at page 4 of his brief cor-
rectly points to limited TV advertising, but is in error with 
respect to radio advertising (see Tr.26, 71 ) and as to there 
being only one ad in the "Daily I-Ierald" (Tr. 25, 71 ) , 
and d·oesn't do justice to the testimony concerning circu-
lation of the "BYU Universe." Mr. Seegmiller testified 
without objection or contradiction (Tr. 15, 16) that there 
are from twelve to thirteen thousand students at B.Y.U. 
and that he, as an alumnus, receives this university news-
paper in his home and has for many years. The Court 
recognized '(Tr. 16) that the paper is distributed to aU 
the students and to some of the townspeople of Provo, 
Utah. The record shows throughout, and it is believed 
·that judicial notice can be taken of the fa·ct, that the stu-
dent body of B.Y.U. is made up of students from many 
parts of Utah, including Ogden and its environs, and that 
there is considerable moving back and forth of towns-
people between Provo, Ogden and Salt Lake City (see, 
for example Tr. 161-167). 
Defendant's brief (p. 4, last para.) points to the 
cross-examination of certain of plaintiffs' witnesses to 
show that p'laintiffs' trade area "did not extend north-
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\vard beyond Salt Lake City and probably not beyond 
lJtah County on June 2, 1961" when they applied for 
rcgistra tion of their trademark. Yet, Mrs. Seegmiller 
testified \vith respect to a total of seventeen specified in-
dividuals from Weber, Davis, and Cache Counties (Tr. 
t ~l9-151) and at least eleven from Salt Lake City and 
environs who come more or less regularly to plaintiffs' 
beauty salon in Provo for their permanents and special 
hair tinting, styling, etc. Only one, Mae Degn, was shown 
to have moved from Ogden prior to the adoption of plain-
tiffs' present name and mark, and this was not contrary 
to Mrs. Seegmiller's direct testimony. Only two, Mrs. 
Lawrence l\1iHs and 1\Iarlene Symthurst, were shown to 
have become plaintiffs' patrons after adoption and use of 
the name by defendant. 
Helen Sanderson of Logan had patronized plaintiff 
for four years prior to testifying in April 1963 (Tr. 151). 
~Irs. \lan Lewen, mother-in-law of Gwen Van Lewen, 
has a home in both Ogden and Springville and has been 
~l regular customer (Tr. 166). Gwen, who lives in Ogden 
but attended Provo High School until 1962 while her 
father \\~as living in Ogden (Tr. 166), has been a patron 
e\·er since the opening of plaintiffs' "Mademoiselle" salon. 
~Iany from the Salt Lake City area have been patrons 
since the opening ( Tr. 1 ~ 7-149), and three have made 
rnany purchases of the trademarked hair spray both in 
Salt Lake City and Provo (Tr. 170). 
Leone Boothe has lh?ed in-Brigham City since Nov-
ember 20, 1959. For the previous fifteen years she lived 
in Salt Lake City. She relies on Marjorie's (Mrs. Seeg-
miller's) supervision and has recommended plaintiffs' sa-
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Ion by its name "Mademoisel11e" to various friends in Brig-
ham City (Tr. 92, 93). T·his and the foregoing are in 
striking contrast to the assertions on page 5 of defendant's 
brief. 
If the lower court meant by its finding of "different 
trade areas" that plaintiffs draw none of their trade from 
the Ogden area, this finding is clearly contrary to the evi-
dence. 
II 
CONSIDERATIONS OF LAW 
If the lower court meant that plaintiffs draw the 
bulk of their business from a different trade area than 
defendant's and that the relatively small amount coming 
from the same trade area is inconsequential, its conclu-
sion of law is erroneous and its decision must be reversed. 
In his brief, defendant has quoted extensively from 
the Restatement of Torts. The quoted matter at the top 
of page 11 of his brief clearly supports plaintiffs, for they 
are seeking protection of their trademark and tradename 
with reference to territory from which they have re-
ceived, and, with the probable expansion of their business, 
may reasonably expect to additionally receive, customers 
in the business in which they use their trademark and 
tradename. The quoted matter under "Comment a" on 
the same page leaves out the follo\ving pertinent portion: 
"If the trade-mark or trade name is unknown in a 
particular territory and there is no probability that 
it will become known there, the use of a similar 
designation in that territory will cause no harm to 
the person having the trade-mark or trade name, 
since it cannot lead to mistaken association with that 
person." (3 Restatement of Torts, par. 732, p. 604). 
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The testimony clearly shows that plaintiffs' trade-
mark and tradename are neither unknown nor static in 
'Veber, Davis, and Cache Counties. Those who know of 
the trademark and tradename tell their friends, and there 
is a continuing coming to B.Y.U. at Provo of students 
from these three counties and a continuing returning of 
these students to their homes in the same three counties. 
Both Dell Harrie, manager of Paramount Beauty 
Supply, Salt Lake City, and Dorothy Odekirk, Mutual 
Beauty Supply, testified from personal knowledge that it is 
not unusual for women to travel at least a hundred miles 
to a favorite salon for special hair treatment such as per-
manent waves (Tr. 104, 105, 111, 123). Ann Stanger 
testified that she had sent cards announcing the opening 
of plaintiff's salon to several women in Logan and Ogden 
(Tr. 84, 85). 
Certainly, plaintiffs' and defendant's "different trade 
areas", as they are characterized by the lower court, are 
not "separate markets wholly remote the one from the 
other," as required by the Hanover Star Milling case if 
the question of prior appropriation is to be legally in-
significant (see quoted matter on page 7 of plaintiffs' 
main brief). Rather, defendant's trade area is a market 
into which the use of plaintiffs' trademark and tradename 
have extended and their meanings have become known 
and are continuing to further become known. 
III 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
The use of plaintiffs' mark and name in Ogden and 
the advertising thereof throughout the surrounding area 
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by defendant has very likely caused and is very likely to 
continue to cause harm to plaintiffs by mistaken associ-
ation. 
On page 6 of its brief, d.efendant asserts that no 
actual confusion has ·ever resulted and refers to Tr. 33 for 
support. There, Mr. Seegmiller merely testified to the 
fact that no one had ever told him that business had been 
done with the de£endant's establishment thinking it was 
plaintiffs'. 
There is, however, testimony as to several instances of 
actual confusion. Letty B. Hust, who lives in Ogden and 
buys plaintiffs' trademarked hair spray from Mr. Seeg-
miller in Salt Lake City, was confused when she saw de-
fendant's newspaper ads (Tr. 18, 27, 77-78, 80). Mr. 
Seegmiller :testified to hearing and denying rumors that 
they had opened a salon in Ogden (Tr. 30). Many of 
the Ogden students at B.Y.U. have asked plaintiffs 
wh·ether the Ogden salon was theirs (Tr. 34). The order 
clerk at Peerless Beauty and Barber Supply in Salt Lake 
City was confused (Tr. 93). Dorothy Odekirk of Mutual 
Beauty Supply, Salt Lake City, testified to incidents of 
confusion (Tr. 120, 183). Sharon Whitaker, a former 
student of B.Y.U. whose home is in Ogden, testified that 
she had mentally associated defendant's establishment in 
Ogden with plaintiffs' in Provo (Tr. 138) and had act-
ually visited the former on two occasions (Tr. 135). 
Although Sharon Whitaker inquired as to whether 
there was any connection between the two salons and 
received the proper information, there is considerable like-
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lihood that others have not made and might not make 
such inquiry, in which event plaintiffs would have lost or 
may lose business intended for them. Sh·ould the services 
rendered by defendant's salon have been, or should they at 
any time be, unsatisfactory, plaintiffs might have lost or 
might well lose future patronage, either from those who 
would otherwise travel to Provo for their permanents and 
other special services and products, or from B.Y.U. stu-
dents home in Ogden and its environs for the summer. 
IV 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE CONTEMPLATED FUTURE 
EXPANSION 
Defendant asserts that plaintiffs have not contem-
plated future expanision into defendant's trade area (Tr. 
6). Yet, the very testimony referred to as support for this 
assertion shows that expansion to both Salt Lake City and 
Logan has been contemplated (Tr. 177). 
Plaintiffs adopted their trademark for hair spray 
because a wholesale drug firm told them it wanted to 
distribute both their hair spray and shampoo (Tr. 16-17). 
Later, this same firm asked them about use of the mark 
on cosmetics, and this was one of the reasons Mr. Seeg-
miller undertook to register the trademark in June 1961 
(Tr. 29). Because of the present litigation, this arrange-
ment for widespread distribution of the trademarked 
products has never been consummated. 
The probability of territorial expansion by the first 
user of a trademark, although no expansion had ac-
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tually been undertaken and no question of bad faith by 
the adverse user was involved, has been regarded as im-
portant by recent cases. 
"Thus, the rights to a trademark extend through-
out the entire territory actually served by the owner, 
or covered by his advertising, and also, it would seem, 
at least to an area which would provide room for 
probable or anticipated expansion. See Hanover 
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. at page 415; 
Food Fair Stores, In·c. v. Food Fair Stores, 1 Cir., 
177 F. 2d 177, 83 USPQ 14; Triangle Publications, 
Inc. v. Central Pub. Co., W. D. Mo., 117 F. Supp. 
824, 100 USPQ 185." 
Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co. 
252 F. 2d. 945; 116 USPQ 348, 356 (2nd Cir., 
1958) 
"By reason of the fact that long before plaintiff's 
claimed uses, Utah was within the defendant's nor-
mal expansion territory for its use of the trade name 
"American Oil Company" and its trademarks 
"American" and "Amoco," defendant is entitled 
under the common law of Utah to the exclusive in-
trastate use throughout Utah of said trade name and 
trademarks, and to an injuction against plaintiffs 
. u h ,, use In ta .... 
Nielsen v. American Oil Co. 
203 F. Supp. 473; 133 USPQ 188, 191 (D.C. 
Utah, 1962) 
See also: 
Younker v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
175 O.S. 1; 137 USPQ 901, 906 (Ohio Sup. Ct., 
1963) 
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v 
PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR TRADEMARK 
REGISTRATION 
Defendant attempts to show that plaintiffs are guilty 
of swearing fa~lsely to the affidavit that accompanied 
their application in June 1961 for Utah State trademark 
registration and, therefore, come into court with unclean 
hands. 
This stand is completely wi~thout merit and should 
lead the Court to examine with great care the other as-
sumptions and reasoning employed by d·efendant. 
Defendant takes his stand on the assumption that the 
wording "or a trade-mark, trade name, or service mark 
previously used in this state by another" in Sec. 70-3-2 
( 6), Utah Code Annotated, refers to use by someone oth·er 
than the applicant prior to the application for registra-
tion, whereas the only possible meaning is such a use prior 
to the applicant's use. 
Whether or not plaintiffs knew of defendant's use of 
their name and mark at the time of their application is 
entirely immaterial. The only thing that could defeat 
plaintiffs' rights in any part of the State of Utah would be 
the establishment of con1mon law rights by another in 
some portion of the State prior to plaintiffs' registration 
(Sec. 70-3-15, Utah Code .. A.nnotated). Whether or not 
defendant has acquired adverse common law rights in 
the Ogden area is up to this Court to decide. If it up-
holds defendant's asserted claim, plaintiffs' registration 
should remain valid and in force as to all who cannot 
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similarly assert adverse common law rights. Such is the 
intent and purpose of the Statute. 
"All the States and the Federal Government 
have some legislation pertaining to trade-marks ... 
The legislation is of the declarative type; that is, it 
does not create the trade-mark right, but only re-
cognizes existing rights and provides for their greater 
protection . . . By providing a registration record, the 
legislation also aids those who desire to adopt marks 
which do not infringe existing trade-marks. But re-
gistration is not required and trade-marks may be 
protected though they are not registered." ( 3 Re-
statement of Tort, par. 715 (f), p. 55 7). 
Defendant cross appeals for alleged damages result-
ing from plaintiffs' registration. There is obviously no 
merit in this cross appeal. 
VI 
DEFENDANT'S USE OF "l\1ADEMOISELLE" 
The pretrial stipulation between plaintiffs and defen-
dant (R 8, 9, No. 5) reads "Defendant was known by 
some customers" under the disputed tradename "Ma-
demoiselle" prior to June 2, 1961. This is something quite 
different from the statements of "many" customers, as 
found in the first full paragraph of page 2 and the first 
paragraph of page 6 of defendant's brief. 
At the top of page 7 of his brief, it is said that de-
fendant "had previously (prior to June 2, 1961) become 
identified by his trade name 'Mademoisell~e Coiffures' in 
Weber County and north Davis County (Stipulation R 8, 
No. 5 ) and the Court so determined . . . ". This is an as-
sumption that is unwarranted by either the cited stipula-
tion or by the findings. Moreover, it is unsupported by 
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the evidence. Defendant's advertising commenced on 
~fay 19, 1961, but the salon didn't open until May 29th. 
If the Memorial Day holiday is excluded, there were only 
three working days before June 2, 1961, when plaintiffs 
registered their mark. 
There is nothing of significance in the newspaper ad-
vertisements run by defe~ndant or in anything else of re-
cord which would lead the public to identify the name or 
mark with someone other than plaintiffs. The evidence 
all points to the fact that defendant's Ogden establish-
ment was associated in the public mind with plaintiffs' 
Provo establishment. 
On page 16 of his brief, def,endant assumes that he 
had built up a "secondary meaning" for plaintiffs' trade-
mark identifying him, as against plaintiffs, in the public 
mind in a total of less than two weeks of advertising and 
only a few days of actual operation. This would be far 
fetched in any view of the circumstances of this case and 
of the law applicable thereto. The Federal statute and 
most state statutes, including Utah's, require a showing of 
fh·e years of exclusive use to establish prima facie second-
~l ry meaning. 
VII 
OTHER ERRORS IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
On page 13, defendant cites Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier 
Refining Co., 213 F. 2d 355 ( 1954) as a Utah case de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Utah. It is actually a 
Federal case of the lOth Circuit affirming a decision by 
Judge Ritter in the District Court for Utah involving 
very different facts than exist here. As recognized in de-
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fendant's brief, the quoted matter is purely dictum and 
is not supported in its broad connotations either by Judge 
Ritter's d·ecision in the very recent case of Nielsen v. 
American Oil Co. (supra) or by the other cases cited 
under Point IV herein. 
From the Sweet Sixteen quotation and accompany-
ing statement appearing on page 15 of defendant's brief, 
it is apparent that defendant does not understand the 
difference between a technical or common law trade mark 
and a mark that becomes protectible at common law only 
by reason of the acquisition of a "secondary meaning." 
(See Addenda). 
The Sweet Sixteen case recognized no need for a 
considera:bl~e number of potentially misled customers in 
order to establish market confusion in instances of a 
technical trademark, such as "Sweet Sixteens" or "Made-
moiselle" (See p. 11, def' s brief) . 
ADDENDA 
To avoid confusion in meaning of certain terms as 
commonly employed in the law of trademarks and un-
fair ·competition and as here employed by plaintiffs, in 
contrast to the way they are employed in the Restatement 
of Torts, the following explanation is given: 
"Trade-mark" as used in the Restatement has the 
same meaning as "technical trademark" as commonly 
employed. It is a mark actually applied to goods sold in 
commerce and having no inherent disability, such as 
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being a word descriptive of the goods, a geographical 
term, or a surname. It requires no showing of secondary 
meantng. 
As commonly employed, the word "trademark" is 
a broad designation. It applies equally to a technical 
trademark and to a descriptive or geographical word or 
a surname that becomes, in legal effect, a technical 
trademark by reason of acquiring a secondary meaning 
(see Nim "Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks," 4th 
Ed., pp. 511' 512). 
"Trade name" as used in the Restatement means 
either a business name, as contrasted with a mark actually 
applied to goods sold in comm·erce, or a word used as a 
trademark but requiring the acquisition of a secondary 
meaning before it is given the legal effect of a technical 
trademark. 
As commonly employed among trademark attorneys, 
a "tradename, is nothing more than a business name, i.e. 
the name under which a person does business. When such 
a name is also applied to goods as a trademark, its legal 
status depends upon whether, in any given instance, it is 
used as a tradename or as a trademark. In the present 
case, "Mademoiselle" is used by plaintiffs as both a trade-
name and a trademark, but by defendant only as a trade-
name. 
:\ "service mark" is a creature of Federal and State 
statutes, so far as equivalency to a trademark is con-
cerned. Otherwise, it is regarded legally much as a busi-
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ness or trad·e name is (see Daphne Robert "The New 
Trade-Mark Manual," p. 16). 
The Utah statute, Title 70, Utah Code Annotated, 
contains no definition of nor does it provide for the re-
gistration of a "trade name," but it is clear from Sees. 
70-3-2 (6) (7) that the term, as used, means a business 
name. Registration of a mark that has achieved the legal 
status of a technical trademark by the acquisition of a 
secondary meaning is provided for in Sec. 70-3-2 ( 5). 
Plaintiffs' mark was registered as a technical trademark 
or servi·ce mark requiring no showing of secondary mean-
ing (Def's Ex. 2). 
Respectfully submitted, 
LIONEL M. FARR, Esq. 
574 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON, Esq. 
for CHRISTENSON, NOVAK, 
PAULSON & TAYLOR 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
PHILIP A. MALLINCKRODT, Esq. 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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